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We cannot know whether Pavlov's dogs can escape from their conditioned
existence.
-- Krisis, Manifesto Against Labour
Introduction
In his interpretation and application of Claude Shannon’s mathematical theory of
communication, Friedrich Kittler introduces a way to read literature as a
communication system. 1 Taking a similar approach, I read the circulation of
capital as a (formal and material) communication process. On the assumption that
the circuit of capital is a schematic or diagram of a communication process, the
circulation of capital that Marx describes in Capital Vol. 2 and Grundrisse can be
understood as a theory of communication.2 What capital communicates is value
(more precisely surplus value), which can be considered as the “content” of this
communication.3
Kittler argued that “[m]edia determine our situation, which – in spite or
because of it – deserves a description.” 4 What follows is such a description.
Capital is more than just a concept or abstraction, and despite it being an
independently acting agent, it must rely on various media for its iterative
communication process. Marx draws attention to this with the first logistical
1

Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1964); Friedrich Kittler, Discourse Networks
1800/1900 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).
2
Karl Marx, Capital Vol. 2 (London: Penguin Classics, 1978); Karl Marx, Grundrisse
(London: Penguin Classics, 1973), 401-423, 516-549, 618-690, 717-735; Vincent
Manzerolle and Atle Mikkola Kjosen, “The Communication of Capital: Digital Media
and the Logic of Acceleration,” tripleC 10, no. 2 (2012): 216, 217. Considering that
this paper views capital’s circulation as a form of communication, it has some clear
resonances with Nicholas Garnham and Christian Fuchs’ arguments that the circuit of
capital should be the starting point for a systematic location of media in capitalism,
and with Jodi Dean’s articulation of “communicative capitalism” and her emphasis on
the absorption of all media into the cycle of capital accumulation. Nicholas Garnham,
Capitalism and Communications: Global Culture and the Economics of Information
(London: Sage, 1990); Christian Fuchs, “Some Theoretical Foundations of Critical
Media Studies: Reflections on Karl Marx and the Media,” International Journal of
Communication, no. 3 (2009); Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies:
Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics (Durham and London, Duke University
Press, 2009).
3
Marx, Grundrisse, 626.
4
Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1999), xxxix.
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statements in Capital, where he writes that because the commodity is a thing it
cannot walk to the market on its own; its guardian must lend it feet, and on the
market his tongue to speak its price. 5 Although commodities still need help
moving, their guardians’ feet have today been replaced or extended (depending on
your point of view) by container boxes of intermodal freight and soon in
intelligent transportation systems; human tongues are extended in universal
product codes (UPC) and arphids (RFIDs), though they primarily speak to other
things rather than to human beings. 6 This paper, however, will foreground the
media and mediums formed by economic categories and human beings
respectively.
In the theoretical chapter of his lectures on optical media, Kittler argues
that McLuhan’s approach to media got it wrong. Noting that McLuhan was
correct in connecting physiology directly with technology, Kittler argues that
because McLuhan (being a literary critic) “understood more about perception than
electronics … he attempted to think about technologies in terms of bodies rather
than the other way around.”7 For Kittler the “unquestioned assumption that the
subject of all media is naturally the human is methodologically tricky.”8 In his
communication theory, human beings are components of large-scale information
systems, on the same level with technology and institutions. Human beings are
not the subjects of history; they are merely along for the ride as “the nodes and
operators necessary to keep the process going until the time arrives at which
media are able to interact and evolve without any human go-between”9
I agree with Kittler. The subject of the economic communications systems
represented in the circuit of capital is capital. In Das Kapital, Marx argues that the
subject in the capitalist mode of production is value-as-capital. Through its selfvalorization, value preserves and expands itself by constantly changing from one
form into another (M – C – M’). In this process, value is “dominant” and
“becomes transformed into an automatic subject.” 10 Similarly, in Grundrisse,

5

Karl Marx, Capital Vol. 1 (London: Penguin Classics, 1976), 178, 189.
This should come as no surprise; commodities speak to each other, not to Men. Marx,
Capital Vol. 1, 176-177.
7
Kittler, Optical Media, (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010), 29.
8
Kittler, Optical Media, 30.
9
Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media (Malden, MA and Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2011), 65. At best human beings are “the sex organ[s] of the machine world, as
the bee of the plant world, enabling it fecundate and to evolve ever new forms.”
Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (London:
Routledge, 1964), 56.
10
Karl Marx, Capital Vol. 1 (London: Penguin Classics, 1976), 255.
6
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Marx writes that capital “exists as the subject of circulation.” 11 In its
communication, capital posits economic categories or “determined economic
forms” that it must pass through to become capital. People wear these categories
as “economic character masks” and are therefore their personifications. 12 As
personified economic categories, individuals must carry out the logic or function
associated with the economic form, such as buying, selling or valorizing capital.
Consequently, from the point of view of circulating capital, human beings are its
mediums of transmission. It therefore makes little sense to let the human take
center stage in a description of how media determine our situation. This paper
thus focuses on capital’s media rather than media for human beings.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the roles individual human beings
play and the functions they carry out in the circulation of capital through the lens
of the new materialist communication and media theory of Kittler.13 In particular,
it will explore the connections between Marx’s theory of value and how Kittler’s
media theory reduces the human’s ontology to the status of components of
information processing and communication systems in order to set in relief
Marx’s argument that individuals are personifications of economic categories.
This paper questions the subjectivity and agency of human beings when they are
involved in economic activity. With reference to Kittler’s concept of discourse
network, I consider whether human beings in the communication of capital can be
treated as programmable human matter.14 By doing so, this paper brings Kittler’s
project of “driving the spirit out of the humanities” to Marxism by removing the
human being from its privileged position in Marx’s political economy. 15
Consequently it examines whether a nonhuman Marxist theory is possible. Such a
move necessitates taking a strong deterministic stance, adopting the point of view
of capital, bracketing the social and flogged categories of labour, production and
class struggle in favour of the value form, circulation and programmability. 16
11

Karl Marx, Grundrisse (London: Penguin Classics, 1973), 620, 746. Although capital
is a subject, it is one that lacks consciousness and can be compared to the deity
Azathoth from H. P. Lovecraft’s mythos. This elder god, living at the centre of the
universe and referred to as the Blind Idiot God, is said to be completely indifferent to
the cosmos and not be aware of its own existence.
12
Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 92.
13
Kittler, Discourse Networks; Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter; Kittler, Optical
Media; Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media; Jussi Parikka, What is Media
Archaeology? (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012).
14
Kittler, Discourse Networks; Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media.
15
See, Friedrich Kittler, ed., Austreibung des Geistes aus den Geisteswissenschaften:
Programme des Poststrukuralismus (München: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1980).
16
I leave it up to the reader whether this determinism serves as a contribution towards a
critique of the bourgeois category of “free choice.”
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Although the former categories are vital to Marx’s theory, this paper, for the sake
of argument, makes the assumption that production, exploitation and the class
struggle runs as if on autopilot and thus that capital is accumulated without
interruption. This line of argument and interpretation is admittedly a selective
one, but necessary for pursuing the core argument of whether human beings can
be treated as programmable human matter. By driving out the conscious human
element, what remains is a description of capital that veers close to a fetishism of
capital.17
The argument will proceed as follows: it starts with a discussion of the
circuit and circulation of capital and argue, drawing on Kittler’s interpretation of
Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication, that economic categories
forms the elements of capital as a communications system. The paper then turns
to Kittler’s concept of the “discourse network” in order to elucidate how human
behaviour can be understood as a form of programming. After discussing how
economic categories program individuals’ economic behaviour, the paper relies
on Jacques Lacan’s concept of “jammed machine” in order to consider how this
programming can be understood as a limiting of choice. Lastly, the paper
considers capitalism as an inhuman economy that show no regard for human
beings and it speculates that humans could be eliminated from the circuit
altogether.
The Circuit of Capital as Communications Diagram
Marx describes capital with the formula M – C (Lp+Mp)…P…C’- M’, which
expresses the identity-in-difference of a universal concept (capital) that
constitutes itself through a change of particular forms (M, C and P). 18 Figure 1
17

Considering Kittler’s strong anti-humanist, anti-sociological and anti-economist bias
and his rejection of grounding technological innovation in socio-economic contexts or
the desires and intentions of human subjects, the juxtaposition with Marx may seem
odd. He refers dismissively to the human being and its supposedly unique
characteristics of consciousness and subjectivity as “so-called Man” and, following
Foucault, he questions whether there has been, is or ever will be something called
“Man.” With his disdain for people, Kittler would be a very strange bedfellow for
Marx who has a strong humanist bias that borders on the vitalistic, and argues that
labour, alongside creativity, imagination and consciousness are exclusive human
characteristics. Being a good Feuerbachian, Marx bases his political economy on an
anthropological critique: the social relationship of human to human is the basic
principle of critical theory. Marx’s task, which could not be any more different than
Kittler’s, is to return social phenomena (e.g. religion and economics) to relations
between humans. Human practice is at the center of Marx’s theory.
18
Marx, Capital Vol. 2, 109.
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represents the circuit of capital as an iterative, circular process in which value
passes through a sequence of mutually connected metamorphoses of economic
forms that comprise three stages of a total process. Two of the stages belong to
the sphere of circulation and one to the sphere of production. In this circulatory
process value both maintains itself and increases its magnitude, and can repeat the
process anew after completing all the stages and assuming and discarding the
forms of money- (M), productive- (P) and commodity-capital (C’) in succession.19
Capital as a concept is thus the unity-in-process of the stages and particular forms;
if this unity is not maintained capital is negated and devalued.20 Capital is thus
perpetually becoming. Movement is life; stasis is death, and ideally capital
circulates as it does in the mind, at the absolute velocity of speed of thought or
light.21 Capital is a material process, however. When capital assumes an economic
form, it must also “invest itself in matter, something that may in fact be resistant
to it.”22 Capital’s movement (its communication) depends on the economic and
material form that it assumes, and transmission is always faster than
transportation.

19

Marx, Capital Vol. 2, 132-133.
Marx, Grundrisse, 519, 621; Marx, Capital Vol. 2, 123-124.
21
Marx, Grundrisse, 519, 536, 548, 621. The apotheosis of capital’s logic of compulsive
acceleration is represented in high-frequency trading (HFT), which is the use of
algorithms to trade securities at time-scales measured in microseconds, and has little to
do with human action. Donald MacKenzie, “How to Make Money in Microseconds,”
London Review of Books 33, no 10 (2011); see also Manzerolle and Kjøsen, “The
Communication of Capital,” 220.
22
Christopher John Arthur, “The Fluidity of Capital and the Logic of the Concept,” in
The Circulation of Capital: Essays on Volume Two of Marx's Capital, ed. Christopher
John Arthur and Geert Reuten (London: MacMillan Press, 1998), 117. Whether capital
has the material form of bits or atoms does not, strictly speaking, matter.
20
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Figure 1:: The circuit of Capital
Capital.

Marx stresses that capital “can only be grasped as a movement, and not as
a static thing.. Those who consider the autonomization of value as mere
abstraction forget that the movement of industrial capital is this abstraction in
action.” 23 The diagram of capital is thus but a static representation of an
operational, physical process that proceeds in space and time by way of various
media that include human beings, institutions, technical devices and increasingly
more and more non-human
human agents. The circuit abstractly describe
describess the purposeful
movement of capital as matter in various economic guises, that is, the movement,
at a given speed, of commodities and money through space and time, and their
connection to the production process. As such, the particular “independent circuits
circui
of individual capitals” assume the form of supply chains, logistical networks that
comprise the integration of production, transportation infrastructure and vehicles,
fiber optics, packages and packets, warehouses and servers and so on.
Consequently, thee diagram of capital is also a topological abstraction of a physical
process executed through time and space
space.24 Because each form or stage is a point
of departure and return, these moments also represent a set of spatial co--ordinates
23
24

Marx, Capital Vol. 2,, 185, emphasis added.
Marx, Capital Vol. 2, 110.
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or addresses and temporal waypoints, where circuits of capital intersect, and the
nodes from where capital relays to value to its next destination.25
In generalized commodity societies, nobody can consciously regulate the
distribution of social labour among the various branches of production. This
distribution is instead regulated by value. In Isaak Illich Rubin’s formulation,
value functions as “the transmission belt which transfers the movement of
working processes from one part of society to another, making that society a
functioning whole.”26 From this point of view, the circuit of social capital can be
seen as a distributed information processor and coordinator of value. Because
circuits of capital intertwine and presuppose one another, they process in parallel
the distribution of labour between the various branches of production. 27 The
circuit also expresses capital as an articulating force on the time-axes of labour
and circulation; an articulation of the (cybernetic) control of dead and living
labour by capital. Consequently, value’s abstractions (i.e. economic forms)
mediate the reproduction of social life in generalized commodity societies. When
subsumed into the circuit of capital, the economic forms gain the social form of
capital and therefore become forms particular to capital.28
In Grundrisse Marx writes that nothing “can emerge at the end of the
process which did not appear as a presupposition and precondition at the
beginning. But, on the other hand, everything also has to come out.”29 A process
that posits its preconditions as results of its own process is (one of) Marx’s
definitions of a mode of production, and the transition from one mode to the next
occurs when a system is able to take pre-existing socio-economic forms and
reproduce them as the mode’s own conditions.30 Marx bases the logic of capital’s
25

Marx, Capital Vol. 2, 180. Thus the individual points in Figure 1 can be superimposed
on a world map: M refers to the location of a company’s HQ; P to the point of
production; C’ points of exchange/ market places; and the functions M-L and M-Mp
indicate the existence of labour and other commodity markets, and therefore the
existence of other independent, individual circuits of capital.
26
Isaak Illich Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, (Montreal and New York, NY:
Black Rose Books, 1973), 81.
27
With social capital, Marx refers to the aggregate of all individual and particular circuits
of capital; the circuit of social capital is thus a universal concept in that it contains in
itself all its particular manifestations. Thus any particular circuit of capital is a
representative of social capital.
28
Depending on the level of analysis, Marx will refer to economic categories as “forms
of value,” “economic forms” or "particular forms of capital.” In this paper I use the
terms more or less interchangeably.
29
Marx, Grundrisse, 304.
30
Logically and historically, capital’s presuppositions are external: they “come in from
the outside, out of circulation… hence not emergent from its inner essence;” these
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reproduction – which is contained in the concept of capital as a circuit, or spiral
for expanded reproduction – on Hegel’s notion that the category that founds the
system must also be the one that is demonstrably its final product for the system
to feed back on itself. 31 Because the “result is already contained in the
presupposition,” all the economic forms drawn into the circuit of capital represent
preconditions that are posited results, i.e. abstract points of departure and return
for turnovers of capital.32
The capitalist mode of production becomes locked in place as a fixed
structure as soon as capital relates to itself as capital, that is when “capital itself is
already presupposed as the condition of its own production.”33 When this occurs
capital not only presupposes itself, but becomes autonomous, establishes itself as
something independent from its constituting power: the collective and generic
forces of human beings.
Capital can only become an independent process and preserve itself
through a constant and continual change of forms, from the general to particular.
The circulation of capital is thus a “series of transformations, in which capital
posits itself; but, as regards value, circulation does not add to it, but posits it,
rather, in the form of value.”34 The forms of money (M), commodities (C’) and
capitalist social relations (Lp and Mp) are “conditions of the production of capital
itself, in so far as its form as capital is posited only to the extent that it passes
through them.”35

external conditions, however, are subsumed by capital’s process and will consequently
become “moments of the motion of capital itself, so that it has itself — regardless how
they may arise historically — pre-posited them as its own moments.” By making the
presuppositions part of its own movement, capital transforms pre-existing phenomena
to fit its own purposes. For example, money “makes a transition to capital” by the
capitalist buying labour-power; after one turnover money “appears as a presupposition
of capital posited by capital itself.” Marx, Grundrisse, 450; 358.
31
The structure of Marx’s dialectical presentation and development of economic
categories in Das Kapital follows the same logic. It starts with the commodity because
it is both the presupposition for and demonstrable product of a mature capitalist mode
of production in which all products of labour must assume that particular socioeconomic form. Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 949.
32
Marx, Grundrisse, 307.
33
Marx, Grundrisse, 715.
34
Marx, Grundrisse, 625-626.
35
Marx, Grundrisse, 742.
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Economic forms as media and elements of a communication system
How can the economic forms be viewed as media and part of a communication
system? I first turn to Wolfgang Ernst’s definition of media and then to Kittler’s
interpretation of Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication. Ernst
operates with a narrow, channel-centric definition of media; it is the “physical
passage or place, that mediates something codified and gets decodified at the
other end.”36 Given the above argument that capital passes through the forms it
posits, the economic forms can, according to Ernst’s definition, be viewed as
media. An economic form alone, however, is a category of knowledge, and not
physical or something that can carry out functions on its own. Given that capital
invests itself in matter when it assumes an economic form, by virtue of being a
material object, it occupies a unique place or position in space and therefore can
serve as a physical passage of value.
Because capital is actualized and exists materially as supply chains that
span production and circulation, the physical passage Ernst describes must refer to
the places where economic forms are gathered, which in the case of the
commodity means stores, malls and other places of exchange. 37 The economic
forms, however, lack the ability, at least currently, to execute communicative
economic functions on their own. For this capital relies on mediums: individuals
to take up position within the categories both internal and external to the circuit.
Functions of buying and selling are processes of coding and decoding, that is, of
enabling value to “pass through” the forms that occur during moments of
exchange. During these moments capital’s media merge with its mediums and
find union with presupposed and external personified economic categories in a
particular location in space. To develop this argument in more depth, it is
necessary to examine what economic categories are in Marx’s system and then
consider how and why individuals are personifications of them.
Economic categories are the “theoretical expressions, the abstractions of
the social relations of production.” 38 That is, the categories express productive
relations (i.e. class relations) between people in the capitalist mode of production.
Because the relations of production “connect people only through things, the
things perform a particular social function and acquire a particular social form
36

Jussi Parikka, “Archival Media Theory: An Introduction to Wolfgang Ernst’s Media
Archaeology,” in Digital Media and the Archive, by Wolfgang Ernst and ed. Jussi
Parikka (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 19.
37
For the forms of money- and productive capital, the physical passage refers
respectively to pockets, wallets (analog or digital), safes, mattresses and where bank
accounts are kept, and to various points of production, such as factories, restaurants
and offices etc.
38
Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (New York, NY: Cosimo Inc., 2008), 119.
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which corresponds to the given type of production relations.”39 The capitalist’s
status is thus determined by ownership or control over capital, the means of
production and products of wage-labour; the status of the worker is determined by
ownership of labour power; and the landlord is determined by ownership of
land.40 If economic categories are the “bearers” of social relations it also the case
that the categories “express social functions, or social forms, which are acquired
by things as intermediaries in social relations among people.”41 In the preface to
the first edition of Capital, Marx writes:
To prevent any possible misunderstandings, let me say this. I do
not by any means depict the capitalist and the landowner in any
rosy colours. But individuals are dealt with here only in so far as
they are the personifications of economic categories, the bearers of
particular class-relations and interests. My standpoint… can less
than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose
creature he remains, socially speaking, however much he may
subjectively raise himself above them.42
When referring to the activity of people engaged in exchange, Marx argues that
the “persons exist for one another merely as representatives and hence owners, of
commodities” and “in general, that the characters who appear on the economic
stage are merely personifications of economic relations; it is as the bearers of
these economic relations that they come into contact with each other.” 43 And
throughout Capital, Marx repeatedly refers to individuals in such a manner, for
example, as wearing “economic character masks,” playing economic roles, the
capitalist being a representative of capital, and the worker being “nothing more
than personified labour time.”44
What does Marx mean by this description of individuals as personified
economic categories, which are also attached to things? This is, of course, Marx’s
theory of the fetish, which reveals that relations between people take the form of
relations between things; in generalized commodity societies, people “do not
relate to each other in a direct social way; they first enter into a relationship with

39

Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, 35.
Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, 19.
41
Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, 35. Indeed, Marx’s system “system
examines a series of increasingly complex ‘economic forms’ of things or ‘definitions
of form’ which correspond to a series of increasingly complex production relations
among people.” Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, 37.
42
Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 92, emphasis added.
43
Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 178-179.
44
Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 179, 206; 342, 423, 424, 739; 353.

40
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one another during the act of exchange – through the products of their labour.”45
Things have the social function of connecting people, and from this point of view
the thing is an intermediary and consequently a bearer of the productive relation.46
As such, these social relations are naturalized with the effect that “it appears as if
things have the properties and autonomy of subjects.”47 The implication of this
argument is that the rationality behind economic activity comes from the things
(the economic forms) and not from any coherent, unified human subject with
consciousness and free will. I am, however, getting ahead of myself. Before
developing this particular argument, I first consider how economic forms can be
considered elements of the communication system that is capital. I therefore turn
to Shannon’s theory of communication.
For Shannon it is not meaning, representation or anything conditioned by
culture or the social that constitutes media, but is rather the act of transmitting a
message coded into a signal through a noisy channel. Although Shannon was
interested in the engineering aspects of technical systems, Warren Weaver argued
for the theory’s wider applicability, and Kittler, with his concept of discourse
network and his reading of literature as media, has demonstrated the applicability
of Shannon’s model to the humanities.48

45

Michal Heinrich, An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s Capital (New
York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2012), 73.
46
Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, 31.
47
Heinrich, An Introduction, 34.
48
Shannon's theory of communication bears some superficial resemblance to Stuart Hall's
“encoding/decoding” model (loosely based on the circuit of capital) that offers a
theoretical approach to how communication (“messages”) are produced, distributed
and interpreted. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the intellectual
history of both Shannon and Hall’s respective models, a comparison of the two can
help bring out what sort of intervention Kittler did with regards to media theory and
what this paper’s intervention is in Marxist political economy. Shannon’s diagram of a
general communications system (see Figure 2) and Hall's “communicative chain”
appear to be very similar; both have five elements, both uses encoding and decoding of
a message, and both operate with distortion of the message; through a channel in the
case of Shannon and the TV-programme in Hall. The similarity, however, is
superficial and semantic. For Hall encoding yields “messages in the form of a
meaningful discourse,” which in turn is “meaningfully decoded.” Meaning is irrelevant
in Shannon’s model, which centers on the engineering problematic of transmitting an
encoded message through a noisy channel irrespective of whether the content of the
message is gibberish, a random sequence of numbers or meaningful human discourse.
In Shannon' model it is assumed that the transmitter and receiver is on the same side or
co-operate against distortion or interception. Ideally decoding is simply the inverse of
encoding so that there is a perfect match between message sent and message received.
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By ignoring “the being for whom the message connotes or denotes
meaning,” Shannon sought to “clarify the internal mechanism of
communication.” 49 Once the general functions and elements of communication
are known – data source, sender, channel, receiver and data sink – they can be
found in any communications system. Weaver gives the following description of
Shannon's system (see Figure 2):
The information source, selects a desired message out of a set of
possible messages (…).... The transmitter changes [encodes] this
message into the signal which is actually sent over the
communication channel from the transmitter to the receiver... The
receiver is a sort of inverse transmitter, changing [decoding] the
transmitted signal back into a message, and handing this message
on to the destination.50

Figure 2: Shannon's general communication system.51

In Hall, however, encoding/decoding “may not be perfectly symmetrical;” there is an
“asymmetry between the codes of 'source' and 'receiver' at the moment of
transformation into and out of the discursive form.” This asymmetry enables resistant
readings or refusals to accept the message. If resistance or refusal were possible in
Shannon's theory, communication would be unsuccessful. Shannon, The Mathematical
Theory of Communication; Stuart Hall, “Encoding/Decoding,” in Culture, Media,
Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-79, ed. Stuart Hall et. al.
(London, Hutchinson, 1980), 130; 131.
49
Kittler, Optical Media, 44.
50
Shannon and Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication, 3-4.
51
Shannon and Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication, 7.
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According to Kittler, information networks can be described only when
they are contrasted to one another and that this can be done on the elemental level
of communication. The elements that constitute communication “can be left
occupied by various agents: by men or women, rhetoricians or writers,
philosophers or psychoanalysts, universities or technical institutions” because it is
“completely unimportant what kinds of entities serve as data source that transmits
a message and data sinks that receive a message, such as humans or gods or
technical devices.” 52 Regardless of what agents stand in for the elements of
communication, they all carry out the general functions of communication –
selecting the message, encoding, transmitting, receiving, decoding and storing.
Can the circuit of capital, however, be described as an information system
with reference to Shannon’s five functions and elements? One could say that
labour-power (Lp), and its dead counterparts (Mp), are the inputs or source; that
the production process encodes labour into the signal of surplus-value, which is
output and transmitted through the channel of the sphere of circulation; surplus
value is then decoded and realized in exchange, and sunk in the storage medium
of money, which is then fed back into the system as accumulated capital. This
simple isomorphism, although tempting to commit to, is not sufficient.
Marx argues that capital is value-in-process. 53 If capital is seen as a
communication system, it is more precise to say that capital is value-intransmission considering that value is the form labour assumes in the capitalist
mode of production.54 The historical point of departure for the capitalist mode of
production was primitive accumulation.55 Conceptually we can interpret original
accumulation as labour being coded as value (“in letters of blood and fire”)56 by
this extra systemic act of accumulation, and consequently that value can be
treated as the signal that is transmitted and augmented through the circuit of
capital. The reproduction of capitalist social relations—the ever-present
separation of labour power from the means of production as premise and result—
ensures that labour remains coded as value. In the communication of capital,
52

Kittler, Discourse Networks, 370; Kittler, Optical Media, 44; see also, Tiziana
Terranova, Network Culture: Politics for the Information Age (London: Pluto Press,
2004), 15.
53
Marx, Grundrisse, 536.
54
Karl Marx, “Marx to Kugelmann in Hanover” (1868), Marxist Internet Archive,
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1868/letters/68_07_11-abs.htm (accessed
May 14, 2013).
55
Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 873-876
56
In the chapter of primitive accumulation in Capital Vol. 1, Marx writes that the history
of capitalism’s origin “is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.”
Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 875.
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value is itself encoded in the particular forms of commodities and money. The
acts of buying and selling represent the functions of decoding and encoding
necessary for the signal to reach its destination in money, the independent form of
value that is always latently capital.57
The economic categories that are posited by capital are thus analogous to
the elements of Shannon’s communication model, and the functions associated
with these economic forms are communicative functions. In the circuit of capital
the entities that serve as the elements of communication are (a) the determined
economic forms, (b) the representatives of economic categories and (c) the capital
subject that, like Moses and the prophets, selects the message to “Accumulate!
Accumulate!” 58 That message can be communicated only if capital keeps (re)
transmitting the signal of value.59
An economic category, however, is empty and therefore non-functional
unless an individual fills it up, and personifies it by carrying out its particular
function. While the categories are the elemental forms of media of capital as a
communication system, individuals are its mediums because they carry out the
associated function. The economic categories perform functions similar to
Shannon’s elements, and, importantly, because these categories are products of
the system and individuals are but representatives of economic categories, the
output or product of the circuit of capital are subjects programmed to function as
mediums for the transmission of value. That is, they are the “nodes and operators
that keep the system going.” 60 To proceed with this argument about

57

A significant lack to the model just described is noise, which is central to both Shannon
and Kittler’s respective theories. Does noise impede, slow or interrupt capital’s
communication, and if so, to what extent? Is the source of noise, from the point of
view of capital, class struggle or from activities such as auto-reduction and digital
piracy? Alternatively, is noise what enables capital to expand its reproduction? In
other words, does noise enter the sphere of production from the activity of living
labour?
58
“Accumulate! Accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!” Marx, Capital Vol. 1,
742.
59
That capital must keep on re-transmitting the message to accumulate rather than being
satisfied with having a latent existence in the storage of money suggest that capital is
inherently space-biased. Capital thus lacks a data sink, which, as Kittler argues in a
very Innisian moment, is “probably an indication of our own situation if all media, as
in Shannon's work, are defined as transmission rather than simply storage media.”
Harold A. Innis, The Bias of Communication, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2008); Kittler, Optical Media, 46.
60
Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 65. This articulation by Winthrop-Young
corresponds well with Marx’s argument that with an “automatic system of
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programmable subjects, it is necessary to take a closer look at the connection
between subjectivity and systems. For this connection I rely on Kittler’s concept
of discourse network and how human activity is an effect of, and programmed by,
the wiring of particular discourse networks.
Discourse networks and hermeneutically conditioned subjects
Kittler relies on Shannon’s model, and seemingly Harold Innis’ understanding of
culture, 61 to develop his concept of discourse network, which designates “the
network of technologies and institutions that allow a given culture to select, store
and process relevant data.”62 As such discourse networks are “a set of large-scale
historically contingent information machines” that “depending on the way the
data inputs, throughputs and outputs are wired, produces basic notions as to why
and to what end this machinery is supposed to function.”63 Among the outputs of
this machinery are subjects and their activity; human beings are compelled to
participate in, take up position with and act within its parameters and protocols. In
Kittler’s media theory, human beings are ontologically reduced to components of
large-scale information systems – be it a discourse network, finite-state automata
(language) running in our unconscious or, as this paper argues, the circuit of
capital – on the same level as technology and institutions. Human beings are not
the subjects of history, rather their subjectivity and activity is posited as functions
of the system, which is equivalent to a form of programming, in order to maintain
its continued existence.
For example, in the 1800 discourse network, people were
“hermeneutically conditioned” to interpret all signifiers (sounds and words),
including noise, as filled with or at the threshold of meaning. Kittler bases his
analysis on an interpretation of Göethe’s poem “Wanderers Nachtlied”
(“Wanderer’s Nightsong”).64 Kittler is “less interested in what the poem is saying
machinery… the workers themselves are cast merely as its conscious linkages.” Marx,
Grundrisse, 692.
61
Innis provides two very short definitions of the function of culture: (1) “It is designed
to train the individual to decide how much information he needs and how little he
needs, to give him some sense of balance and proportion;” (2) “Culture is concerned
with the capacity of the individual to appraise problems in terms of space and time and
with enabling him to take the proper steps at the right time.” Harold A. Innis, “A Plea
for Time,” in Innis, The Bias of Communication, 85.
62
Kittler, Discourse Networks, 369.
63
Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 46; 40.
64
Because understanding Kittler’s analysis from Discourse Networks and Dichter,
Mutter, Kind requires a graduate level knowledge of German literature, I base this
overview on Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and David E. Wellerby’s interpretations. For
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than in uncovering the mechanisms that produce meaning in the first place.”65
This mechanism lies at the center of the 1800 discourse network, which according
to David Wellerby is the “discursive production of the Mother as the source of
discursive production.”66 In terms of Shannon’s five functions, the Mother is the
information source.
In the age of Göethe, mothers were tasked with “turning raw infant
material into individuals equipped with a sufficiently developed psychic center of
resonance and reflexivity, commonly referred to as spirit or soul.”67 Instead of
putting a baby to sleep with sedatives or narcotics, as had been the norm, mothers
were told to use their loving voice singing lullabies, and in general and in
accordance with the new pedagogy of language teaching, to voice what Kittler
refers to as “minimal signifieds.”68 In German these are represented by sounds
such as du mu bu be ma am ag ga, which can easily merge into words. For
example, bu and be result in Bube (little boy) and repeating ma gives Mama.69
The effortless fusion is based on the assumption that minimal
signifieds… are always already pregnant with meaning… This
assumption is reinforced by the new and intimate bond between
mother and infant, for the latter will perceive the voice of the
former as always being directed toward something. Together, the
love of the mother and the semantic plenitude of language
guarantee that whatever comes out of the mother’s mouth will and
must be meaningful.70
Kittler argues that Göethe’s poem is an interpellation: a voice addresses the
wanderer, and in his analysis, it is the voice of the mother who is “speaking to the
wanderer of the way in which nature is speaking to him, with the result that the
wanderer (and his readers) cannot but interpret even the most meaningless noise
as a meaningful message.” 71 The poem recreates the salient features of the
mother’s voice and thereby “trigger[s] in the wanderer and, by extension, in
hermeneutically conditioned readers a response similar to that of an infant
listening to Hush-a-bye-Baby on the Tree Top.”72 The poem is thus a remediation
reference, Göethe’s “Wanderer’s Nightsong” is in Appendix 1. Friedrich A. Kittler,
Dichter, Mutter, Kind (Munich: Fink, 1991).
65
Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 31.
66
David E. Wellerby, “Introduction,” in Kittler, Discourse Networks, xxiii.
67
Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 32.
68
Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 32; Kittler, Discourse Networks, 78.
69
Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 32-33.
70
Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 32-33.
71
Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 31.
72
Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 32.
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of maternal lullabies. Göethe’s wanderer perceives meaningless sounds to be
“brimming with existential significance” because as an infant and child the
mother’s minimal signifieds were always on the threshold of meaning.73 In effect,
mothers equipped their children with a decoder; the poet-philosopher’s cipher that
transform all noise into meaning. Omnipresent meaning is thus the programmed
output of the 1800 discourse network (Figure 3) in which the Mother is the source
of information. She “enters the channel of Poetry as input and, upon exiting the
other side, is collected in the storage medium of Philosophy.”74

Figure 3: Discourse Network 1800.

I present this description of the discourse network with a view to
considering how we might in turn conceive of economic forms and the individuals
that fill them as the programmed output of a circuit in which capital is at the
source of the communication system. In order to continue with the argument we
need to pay attention to Marx’s intent with his labour theory of value and the
value form.
IF you inhabit an economic category, THEN execute its logic

73
74

Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 33.
Friedrich Kittler and Stefan Banz, Platz der Luftbrücke: Ein Gespräch (Berlin:
Oktagon, 1996), 45, quoted in Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 46.
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Michael Heinrich argues that with “value theory Marx seeks to uncover a specific
social structure that individuals must conform to, regardless of what they think.”75
Even a class conscious, militant anarchist communist is subject to the commodity
fetish. All inhabitants of a commodity-producing society are under the control of
things and, by extension, capital. Value is an impersonal relation of domination
that acts through “thingified” economic abstractions. That is, this domination
occurs because “people relate to things in a particular way – as commodities.”76
Individuals do not interact on the free market as the rational actors of vulgar
economics’ homo economicus, but rather “they act as executors of constraints
generated and reproduced by themselves, which are implemented in and through
their conscious actions without, however, these being consciously accessible to
them.”77
With value theory Marx argues that the logic of economic “agents” does
not come from themselves as coherent, rational subjects, but in general from the
system of capital and in particular from the economic categories that the system
posits. Marx refers to this as “economic form determination.” The economic form
determinants are the “given preconditions for the activity and considerations of
commodity-owners who then continually reproduce these conditions during their
activity.” 78 As owners of commodities, individuals “must place themselves in
relation to another as persons whose will resides in those objects.”79 Although
people engaged in economic activity, such as the exchange of commodities, are
formally free in their behaviour, “as commodity-owners they must follow the laws
imposed on them by the nature of commodities.”80 Behaviour on the market can
consequently be understood as unconscious acts.
In other words, economic rationality is stored in things and during the
communication of capital an individual copies and then executes this rationality
as a communicative function when inhabiting an economic category. Importantly,
if “their actions correspond to this rationality, then the activity of individuals also
75

Heinrich, An Introduction, 46.
Heinrich, An Introduction, 75.
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Helmut Reichelt, “Marx’s Critique of Economic Categories: Reflections on the
Problem of Validity in the Dialectical Method of Presentation in Capital,” Historical
Materialism 15 (2007):5.
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Heinrich, An Introduction, 63. The structure of Marx’s presentation in Capital Vol. 1,
particularly the first two chapters, is revealing because they respectively introduce the
“economic form determinations” and the behaviour of people. If the logic of economic
categories determines the activity of human beings, this logic has to be presented and
analyzed prior to the behaviour of so-called human beings.
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Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 178.
80
Heinrich, An Introduction, 63.
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reproduce the presupposed social relations.”81 According to Marx, “commodityowners think like Faust: ‘In the beginning was the deed.’ They have therefore
already acted before thinking. The natural laws of the commodity have manifested
themselves in the natural instinct of the owners of commodities.”82
Thus the valorization of value is the capitalist's “subjective purpose, and it
is only in so far as the appropriation of more wealth in the abstract is the sole
driving force behind his operations that he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital
personified and endowed with consciousness and will.” 83 In an imaginary
discussion over the “law of commodity exchange”84 between a capitalist and the
labour power-owning worker, the latter says: “You may be a model citizen,
perhaps a member of the R.S.P.C.A., and you may be the odour of sanctity as
well; but the thing you represent when you come face to face with me has no heart
in its breast. What seems to throb there is my own heartbeat.”85 The worker makes
salient the following points: it is living labour that creates value and animates the
life process of capital. In other words, labour is the use-value of capital. More
importantly, however, the worker points out that an individual’s personal morals
or ethics are of no importance because the capitalist is a representative of capital
and is therefore programmed to follow its logic of ceaseless and limitless
valorization. That capital compels the capitalist to do (and say) things that he may
not have done or said if he were not a capitalist, is something that Marx returns to
over and again in Capital.
Après moi le deluge! is the watchword of every capitalist and of
every capitalist nation. Capital therefore takes no account of the
health and the life of the worker, unless society forces it to do so.
Its answer to the outcry about the physical and mental degradation,
the premature death, the torture of over-work, is this: Should that
pain trouble us, since it increases our pleasure (profit)? But looking
at these things as a whole, it is evident that this does not depend on
the will, either good or bad, of the individual capitalist. Under free
competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production confront
the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him.86
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Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 180, emphasis added.
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Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 254, emphasis added.
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The law of commodity exchange states that what is exchanged must be quantitatively
equivalent; no defrauding can happen during exchange.
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The “laws of capitalist production” manifest themselves in society through
the “coercive laws of competition,” and these laws “therefore enter into the
consciousness of the individual capitalist as the motives which drive him
forward.”87 These laws of capital are independent of the will and volition of all
individual capitalists. Competition compels capitalists, on pain of ruin, to increase
productivity, lengthening the workday in order to increase the valorization of
capital even if they have no interest in doing so at an individual level. New
methods of production that enable and compel a capitalist to sell his commodities
for less than their current social value forces his competitors to adopt the same
method because they cannot escape the law of determination of value by labour
time.88 The capitalist’s motivating force is thus “an effect of a social mechanism
in which he is merely a cog.”89
Effectively, the capital subject programs individuals according to the
economic form determinants to ensure the transmission of value through the
circuit of capital. This programming can be considered as a limiting of an
individual’s choice, which I will argue with reference to Jacques Lacan’s concept
of the “jammed machine.”90 In order to get to this concept and proceed with the
argument, however, we have to return to Kittler’s discourse networks where we
historically left them: right at the point when Mother was replaced as the
information source of modernity, her removal entailing the end of the
omnipresence of meaning. In the 1900 discourse network the source of discourse
is arbitrary; the source is noise and therefore needs institutions of selection, like
psychoanalysis and psychiatry, to identify human discourse, i.e. to distinguish
between noise and signal.91
Discourse Network 1900
In discourse network 1800, all data streams had to go through the bottleneck of
the symbolic: writing had a monopoly. Reading worked “to raise and cultivate a
soul, to internalize the fundamental order of culture and nature, and to extend an
empire of meaning across the expanse of being. To read was to exorcize
87

Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 433.
Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 436.
89
Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 739.
90
Jacques Lacan, The Seminars of Jacques Lacan. Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory
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meaningless noise in favor of omnipresent meaning.” 92 Phenomena such as
reading, speaking, writing and remembering were subsumed by souls,
consciousness and subjectivity; they were therefore thought unique to human
beings. 93 Kittler identifies Hegel as one of the main culprits of such
subsumptions; he “summed up the perfect alphabetism of his age, he called it
Spirit.” 94 One of the main outputs of the materiality of the dominant media
technology of the 1800 discourse network was “the individual, conscious thinking
subject that produces the world through mental activity.”95 The introduction of
technological media, or more precisely pathological senses as objects of science,
thematizes and separates writing into acoustic, optical and symbolic data streams.
This technological differentiation explodes Gutenberg’s writing monopoly, and
consequently the uniqueness and internal coherence of human beings must be
questioned. Man’s
essence escapes into apparatuses. Machines take over functions of
the central nervous system, and no longer, as in times past, merely
those of muscles. … When it comes to inventing phonography and
cinema, the age-old dreams of humankind are no longer sufficient.
The physiology of eyes, ears, and brains have to become objects of
scientific research. For mechanized writing to be optimized, one
can no longer dream of writing as the expression of individuals or
the trace of bodies. The very forms, differences, and frequencies of
its letters have to be reduced to formulas. So-called Man is split up
into physiology and information technology.96
Kittler argues that Freud’s talking cure revealed language as data stream;
one that operates according to its own set of rules, which can be recorded. 97
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Freud’s intervention reverses the relationship between language and speaker: we
are secondary to language; it speaks us rather than the other way around. The
typewriter, because it “provides writing as a selection from the finite and arranged
stock of its keyboard” forces humans to change their position “from the agency of
writing to an inscription surface.” 98 The typewriter therefore “designates the
turning point at which communications technologies can no longer be related
back to humans.” 99 When information can no longer be mistaken for spirit,
“[t]hought is replaced by a Boolean algebra, and consciousness by the
unconscious, which (at least since Lacan’s reading) makes of Poe’s ‘Purloined
Letter’ a Markoff Chain.”100
Lacan’s reading of Poe was indebted to his encounter with cybernetics,
which for him revealed that symbolic processes are autonomous; language speaks
us because it is essentially a machine, specifically a finite state automaton running
in the unconscious.101 With reference to Boolean logic gates, Lacan noted that
cybernetics introduces “machines which calculate all by themselves” and then
argues that while we are aware that these machines do not think since they have
been told (programmed) what to think, this does not reveal any superiority of man
over machine.102 Rather, “if the machine doesn’t think, it is obvious that we don’t
think either when we are performing an operation. We follow the same
procedures as the machine.”103
Shannon had proved how “statistical properties of any natural written
language can be computed in terms of transition probabilities between its
symbols… the probability of any symbol following any other.”104 In English, “the
probability is actually zero that an initial j be followed by the letters b, c, d, f, g, j,
k, l, q, r, t, v, w, x, or z.”105 This stochastic process, known as a discrete Markoff
process determines the output of speakers and writers. Bernd Frohmann argues
that as
writers produce strings of letters that constitute English words,
their writing down of thoughts is machinic insofar as the transition
from letter to letter is a discrete Markov process. Whether using
quill pen, typewriter, or computer keyboard, the writers function as
98
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machinic writing apparatuses, without any consciousness of the
probability distributions governing their writing.106
The abstraction of labour perpetrated by individual buyers and sellers can
be compared to the writer determined by a Markoff-chain. This abstraction is not
a conscious process, but takes place tacitly: “value… is constituted
unconsciously: the act of equating takes place in a manner which remains obscure
to the participants themselves.”107 Because value is a social characteristic, it is
supersensible, but it nevertheless appears as a tangible characteristic of the thing.
During the moment of exchange we can only perceive the sensuous object, i.e. the
commodity’s use value that confronts the money in our pockets or the databases
of banks. Although the abstraction of labour is an action that takes place in the
mind, it does not occur consciously. Hence, the abstraction carried out in the
moment of exchange is not a mental abstraction, but rather a “real abstraction” by
way of the behaviour of human beings irrespective of their awareness of it.
With a finite state automaton operating in our unconscious, the
“movement of a symbol dictates the correlation between a place in a structure and
a state of the subject.”108 In such a structure, all that a human being really can do
is to “take up position.” Subjectivity therefore becomes “a matter of subject
position, of where the subject finds himself or herself in a predetermined
structure.”109 As an expression of the equal social validity of two qualitatively
different acts of labour (crystallized in their commodity forms), value represents a
specific social relationship. The particular forms capital clothes itself in thus
express the particular content of productive relationships and dictates the position
and function within capital’s circular structure. The following quote from Capital
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Vol. 1 helps to illustrate how individuals take up position in circuit of capital.
Marx argues that by
taking part in the act of sale, the commodity-owner becomes a
seller; in the act of purchase he becomes a buyer. Being a seller
and being a buyer are… not fixed roles, but constantly attach
themselves to different persons in the course of the circulation of
commodities. The complete metamorphosis of a commodity, in its
simplest form [C-M-C], implies… three dramatis personae. First a
commodity comes face to face with money… A commodity-owner
is thus confronted with a money-owner… Money, the final stage of
the first transformation, is at the same time the starting point for
the second. The person who is a seller in the first transaction thus
becomes a buyer in the second, in which a third commodity-owner
comes to meet him as a seller.110
Only commodities and money have faces; individuals wear them as masks and
their physiognomy changes, though only temporarily, according to the economic
form they are positioned within. Having carried out the determined economic
function, the individual leaves the particular subject position, but is then ready to
take up position again. In the sphere of circulation, the subject forms posited by
the circuit of capital can broadly be divided into commodity-owners/sellers and
money-owners/buyers; when entering the sphere of production, “a certain change
takes place, or so it appears, in the physiognomy of our dramatis personae. He
who was previously the money-owner now strides out in front as a capitalist; the
possessor of labour-power follows as his worker.” 111 Figure 4 shows the
presupposed economic roles divided into internal and external positions by
economic functions of buying and selling, and Figure 5 depicts the physiognomic
changes of an individual whose only property is labour-power.
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I should note that in this passage Marx is not referring to the circulation of capital, but
to the circulation of commodities disconnected from a capitalist production process. In
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Figure 4:: Economic roles and subject position in the circuit of capital

112

The latent capitalist becomes a capitalist by purchasing labour
labour-power
power and means of
production from the various owners of commodities: landowner, capitalist owning
means of production and the wage
wage-labourer who possesses labour-power.
power. After
exchange the capitalist
italist has coded his money into variable (labour
(labour-power)
power) and constant
capital (means of production); in production he sets these in motion, is therefore
personified capital and personifies commodity
commodity-capital
capital when production is complete.
Having commodities too sell, he encounters owners of money: the merchant capitalist,
the industrial capitalist and the individual consumer (the only position that transcends
class and which therefore can be occupied by both workers and capitalists).
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Figure 5:: Subject positions for the owner of labour-power

According to the Wertkritiker (value critic) Anselm Jappe, the “subject is
the substrate, the agent,, the bearer that the fetishist system of valorization requires
to assure production and consumption. It is not completely identical to the
individual or the human being, who may on occasion feel the subject
subject-form
form as a
straightjacket.”114 The subject
subject, or more precisely subject-form or position, is what
113

In order to acquire the m
means
eans of subsistence with which to reproduce herself, the
owner of labour-power
power enters the market as a wage
wage-labourer
labourer in order to sell her only
possession to a capitalist other. After entering into exchange with capital, the wage
labourer is subsumed by capi
capital
tal (indicated by the subject designation being placed
inside the circuit), is a worker, or more precisely “personified labour time” in the
sphere of production and for the duration of the working day. Back on the market, the
former worker is now in posses
possession
sion of money (her wages) that she uses to buy the
commodities necessary for her reproduction and thus returning to the position of being
a store of labour-power.
power. From the point of view of the worker, the sphere of
circulation is the sphere of domestic (re
(re)production.
114
Jappe’s critique of the subject is covers both political and economic fetishized
categories. In addition to the economic categories and subject forms of buyer, seller,
landowner, peasant, capitalist and worker, Jappe lists fetishized politic
political
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such as male, female and even success. Anselm Jappe, “The Princess of Clèves
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an individual assumes when carrying out economic functions. The particular
uniqueness of an individual human being is immaterial; what matters is that
individuals take up position within economic categories and execute its function.
Any individual can thus stand in for any other individual in Marx’s presentation;
all that matters is that “they reproduce the preconditioned economic-form
determinant” in order for capital to assume its next form thus guaranteeing
capital’s movement.115
Jammed Machines
By taking up positions within the structure of capital’s circuit, individual human
beings are programmed in the sense that their freedom of choice is limited, which
Jappe’s straightjacket comment indicates. As we will see below, with regards to
communication this limitation is not a bad thing; it is necessary for effective
communication. Collectively, the economic form determinants can consequently
be understood as a jamming mechanism that temporarily fixes the individual to
make a specific pre-determined selection. That is, by taking up position within an
economic form, the human becomes more jammed than it already is. According to
Lacan, the
animal is a jammed machine. It’s a machine with certain
parameters that are no longer capable of variation. And why?
Because the external environment determines the animal, and turns
it into a fixed type. It is in as much as, compared to the animal, we
are machines, that is to say something decomposed, that we
possess greater freedom, in the sense in which freedom means the
multiplicity of possible choices.116
Lacan operates with an information theoretic definition of freedom or agency; the
measure of agency is information. And information is the measure of the
probability of the occurrence of an event and a single selection from a set of
possible states.117 In other words, it is a measure of uncertainty, i.e. “a measure of
what the person receiving the message does not know about it before it
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arrives.”118 The more freedom of choice in selecting the message, the greater is
the uncertainty and the more information is contained in the system.119 Lacan is
interested in such a definition of agency considering he argues that the
unconscious is structured like a language and he is, in part, interested in the
unfreedom in selecting what to say, such as occurs with a Freudian slip. But what
does Lacan mean by saying that compared to the animal we are like machines
because we have a greater degree of freedom of choice? Let us first take a detour
through Kittler on machine subjects, before returning to the difference between
animal, man and machine with reference to Marx’s discussion on labour in the
1844 Manuscripts.120
According to Kittler machines became subjects in 1938 when Konrad
Zuse invented the conditional jump. “Computers operating on IF-THEN
commands are machine subjects” because through conditional jumps a program is
able to determine its future through successive commands, i.e. choices, after the
IF condition is met; IF-THEN thus refers to the “discourse of the other”.121 Not
surprisingly Kittler argues that “both people and computers are ‘subject to the
appeal of the signifier’; that is, they are both run by programs.” 122 Without a
conditional jump, the machine would be a fixed type, like the animal, because
without the IF condition it would not be able to make choices based on changes to
its environment that otherwise would have triggered a jump. What about the
difference between animals and human machines?
As Lacan argues, it is the external environment that “jams” the animal and
turns it into a fixed type. The implication is that the human being has been “freed”
from its environment. In the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx writes:
Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests,
dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only
produces what it immediately needs for itself and its young. It
produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces
only under the dominion of immediate physical need, while man
produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly
produces in freedom therefrom.123
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The human being has greater freedom of choice in what to produce since it,
compared to the animal, produces universally rather than one-sidedly. With
“universal,” Marx means “an individual object which in itself includes all real
existing types of the same object… for example animal.”124 A particular object is
not subsumed by a universal, but is included in it; universal refers to both
abstraction and totality. 125 Thus the human being – as an individual of Homo
sapiens – is freer than the animal because it can choose from all possibilities of
production rather than being determined by its environment and “life-activity.”
Life-activity is productive life and appears to the human being as a means of
satisfying needs. What distinguishes human life-activity from the animal’s is that
the former can take its life-activity as an “object of will and consciousness,”
whereas the animal is “immediately identical with its life activity. It does not
distinguish itself from it. It is its life-activity.” 126 Free, conscious activity is
humankind’s life-activity, but cannot occur when the “pure expenditure of labour
power has been raised to an abstract principle.” 127 In the capitalist mode of
production, workers are identical with wage-labour, i.e. their perverted lifeactivity. Thus the commodity-owning worker, in possession of nothing but their
capacity to labour, is a jammed machine; jammed by capitalist social relations.
These social relations, in which the proletarian is separated from the means of
production, limits the choices an individual has in deciding how to acquire the
means of subsistence, i.e. how to reproduce their life.128
According to Lacan human beings are “jammed, sucked in by the image”
and therefore the “subject is no one;” it is “decomposed, in pieces” and can only
find its “unity in the image of the other,” for our purposes, in commodity
exchange.129 Although we do not turn into fixed types, for occupying an economic
category is fleeting, we are temporarily fixed towards a certain choice of action:
jammed into either buying or selling depending on your position and fixity as a
commodity or money-owner. In exchange, the “image of the other” is the
124
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commodity standing in the equivalent form. 130 The individual finds temporary
unity as a subject with another individual occupying an antithetical position,
because when two commodities are confronted with one another they temporarily
sublate the internal contradiction of the commodity in exchange value by carrying
out the real abstraction of labour.131 The subject finds unity in exchange because
the subject does not exist for anything but for the purpose of ensuring capital’s
communication.
According to Tiziana Terranova, in Shannon’s model the conceptual
“problem of communication is reduced to that of establishing a bridge or contact
between a sender and a receiver. The two extremities of the channel ‘are on the
same side, tied together by mutual interest: they battle together against noise.’”132
When it comes to the communication of capital, all individuals are on the same
side as the capital subject because during the moment of exchange they are for all
intents and purposes tied together by mutual interest; both social individuals and
social capital must reproduce their life process and this reproduction occurs in
part through commodity-exchange. This mutual interest, however, is perverse
considering it derives from an antagonism founded on capital’s original
accumulation.
The mutual interest between capital and human individuals is established
by the former jamming the latter, i.e. by reducing the possible choices the
individual can make. Because information is a measure of uncertainty, an
implication of uncertainty is that “[c]ommunication is the extent a sender is able
to limit the receiver's choices, and information is the extent a receiver knows the
senders choices.” 133 Through its particular forms capital is able to limit the
choices of the individuals that take up positions within them. This limitation is
expressed as a lack of choice in what economic-communicative function is
executed. Although capitalism appears as an immense collection of commodities,
130
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which leads to the belief that the individual has a large degree of freedom of
choice, this is mere appearance and hides the chronic unfreedom and utter
predictability of the capitalist economic system as such.134 Because all products of
labour are commodities and their production occurs under capitalist social
relations, the means of subsistence must be acquired in commodity form and
therefore be bought. On the market this social relationship manifests as the choice
of either buying or selling, depending on what commodity you possess. From the
point of view of social capital all commodities are pseudo-individualized; activity
on the market place is conducted under a “halo of free choice.”135 It turns out that
social capital – the automatic subject of value – is very effective at
communication because it is “able to limit the receiver’s choices” and therefore
predict what an individual will do during the moment of exchange. In the
communication of capital, there are no human beings, only programmable human
matter.
With reference to logistics, the communication of capital is thus about the
co-ordination or scheduling of individuals (capital’s mediums) and fetishized
economic forms that are attached to things (capital’s media) in a particular point
in space and time. In this sense we can understand that the movement of capital,
to paraphrase Johnston, (a) dictates the correlation between a place in the circuit
of capital, (b) a state (subject form) of the individual and (c) what economic
function must be carried out.
Noting that humans have a command of free will (just like cruise
missiles), Kittler argues that with the emergence of computational media
“programmability replaces free will.” 136 In the history of hitherto existing
societies there has never been free will, only human matter programmed to
believe they possess it. Humans, just like Pavlov’s dog and cruise missiles, are
programmed to think and act in very specific ways. Revealing the
programmability of seemingly free agents is the benefit of conceptualizing the
circulation of capital as a communications system and accepting the poststructuralist primacy of systems over subjects. Subjectivity is thus like a program,
which is executed when we take up positions within fetishized economic
categories. Individuals are therefore capital’s mediums; programmable human
134
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matter, which is the perfect complement to the “human resources” found in
production. Capital may need us now as mediums to course through, but human
material may be replaced by other materials. We are part of the diagram of capital
now only because we were part of its historical development, one of the
preconditions that has been absorbed and made to proceed from it, but it is
conceivable that we will be eliminated from the circuit altogether.
An Inhuman Economy
According to Kittler, the ultimate subject of history is technology, which he
understands in a broad sense as “the processing of nature.” This processing was
once dependent on human beings as intermediaries, but since the advent of digital
technology humans are left behind and we are coming progressively closer to a
self-processing of nature. 137 Thus while there was a need for subjects “at one
point in the long history in the encounter between media and bodies” they are no
longer needed once machines can read, write, process, transmit and store without
human input. In a time when computers write themselves and machine-tomachine communication will soon dwarf human-to-human communication,
“biological prostheses become obsolete” because computers “optimize certain
patterns of information processing that were also imposed on human beings and
that subsequently were mistaken for innately human qualities.” 138 Kittler’s
reading of literature as media and his focus on systems over subject, specifically
with the concept of discourse network, reveal that subjectivity was nothing but
programmability. Winthrop-Young summarizes this pithily: “Where subjects
were, there programs shall be – because programs were there in the first place.”139
As such, “each subject is thus an unfree appendage of an undecipherable social
autonomization that the subjects themselves produce and reproduce but which
turns against them.”140 The political implication, according to the Wertkritiker, is
therefore that the subject is “that from which we must be emancipated, and not
that through which in terms of which we must be emancipated.”141
If human beings are not subjects, then what is the subject in Marx’s
political economy? We have now come full circuit; back to the communicating
subject called capital. The basic thought of Marx is that human beings confront
their collective, generic forces for creation as an autonomous, alien deity. The
137
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culmination of this argument is the “conception of the autonomous totality of
social capital as a real total subject, which abstracts itself from the weal and woe
of individual subjects and is ‘indifferent’ to them.”142
In the 1844 Manuscripts Marx argues that the economy is under the sway
of an “inhuman power” and in Capital Vol. 1, Marx argues that value is
indifferent to use value.143 Although value relies on use value to be realized, it is
of no importance what that particular use value is as long as someone will buy it.
As Krisis writes in its provocative “Manifesto Against Labour:”
[I]t doesn’t matter what is being produced as well as what use is
made of it – not to mention the indifference to social and
environmental consequences. Whether houses are built or
landmines are produced, whether books are printed or genetically
modified tomatoes are grown, whether people fall sick as a result,
whether the air gets polluted or ‘only’ good taste goes to the dogs –
all this is irrelevant as long as, whatever it takes, commodities can
be transformed into money and money into fresh labour. The fact
that any commodity demands a concrete use, and should it be a
destructive one, has no relevance for the economic rationality for
which the product is nothing but a carrier of once expended labour,
or ‘dead labour.’144
In other words, the inhuman, alien power of the capital subject is indifferent to
human beings and their needs. The object, the particular use value is “dragged
along” by value, and it must persist so that the “’independent value does not
collapse into itself’ and so that the production of value in objective form does not
lose its secure basis.” 145 Capitalist commodity production was never directly
geared towards the satisfaction of needs, but always towards the ceaseless and
unlimited valorization of value. If any human needs are satisfied in the process, it
is only a by-product of the real aim of capitalist production, which is surplus
value. Use value is only necessary in so far as it aids value in its movement,
transformation and self-augmentation; it is merely an interface between the
inhuman life of capital and human social life. And as all interfaces do, they trick
us into believing that the system is about us. Kittler introduces us to the
inhumanity of the technological systems we inhabit. He observes that the internet
is a point-to-point transmission system that copies “almost infallibly not from
142
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men to men, but, quite the contrary, from machine to machine.”146 With similar
intent, Bernhard Siegert argues that the
more optimal that codes, connections, and transmissions become,
the more they distance themselves from humans and their
redundant languages. If a computer system were not surrounded by
an environment of everyday languages, there thus would be no
software. User interfaces alone provide humans with the
narcissistic belief that everything that goes on is being delivered to
them.147
In the limitless dynamic of capital as self-valorizing value, all that matters is that
value is transmitted through the circuit and capital is accumulated. Hence, let us
drop any foolish notions that an economy based on generalized commodity
exchange is for, let alone beneficial to, human beings or, for that matter, the
environment. Après moi le deluge! It therefore makes sense to bracket the social
and such notions as class struggle, exploitation and labour, and assume, quite
deterministically, that capital’s accumulation runs on autopilot.
If capital accumulation does run on autopilot, class struggle does not fulfill
its negative potential, and the human being is not just pushed to the side of
production, but pushed to the side of the economy as such, how would that affect
human beings? If capitalism is about unemployment as Frederic Jameson argues,
there would be a progressive rise in the surplus population that would at some
point, from the point of view of capital, become an unnecessary overstock of
human material that at some point will be discarded or destroyed.148 Such a world
would bear a striking resemblance to the one described in F. T. Marinetti’s
futurist visionary hypothesis of “Electric War,” but with the human engineers in
the vision removed altogether and replaced with non-human matter.149 Beyond the
technological singularity, a capitalism without human beings may very well look
like something out of Charles Stross’ Accelerando or Saturn’s Children in which
humanity has been expelled from the solar system by a capitalism run amok or
gone extinct, but survived by their artificial progeny.150
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Postscript
The preceding has been a description of how media determine our situation.
When referring to the systems of communication that is the circuit of capital, it is
more precisely the economic forms that determine our situation and deserve a
description. This description does not need to include human beings, articulating
instead the forms they personify. At present, the circulation of capital requires
human matter to facilitate its movement and self-valorization, but non-humans,
such as machines, robots, androids and software bots, can arguably play that same
role.151 A human focus or centering is not required.152 By bracketing the social in
favour of a determinism of capital, it is possible to read the circulation of capital
as a physical process subject to the laws of thermodynamics, gravity and nationstates, but not human will. The question then becomes whether non-humans can
play a similar role in production.
The capitalist economy represents a totality of social relations of
production (social forms) and forces of production (material-technological). From
the point of view of Marxist political economy, Kittler’s brand of new
materialism could be said to belong to the latter category, though one in which
some of the forces of production are post-human agents. Machines “take on
tasks—drawing, writing, seeing, hearing, word processing, memory, and even
knowing—that once were thought unique to human and often perform them
better.” 153 What is thought unique to human beings in Marx’s theoretical
framework is to labour. To possibly merge the technical with the social thus
hinges on whether non-humans, such as androids, robots and software bots can
a technological creation of (artificial) super-intelligence, though predicting what a
post-singular world or being would be like is nearly impossible. Ray Kurzweil, The
Singularity is Near (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 135-136.
151
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consciously and purposively labour and therefore create surplus value. The
orthodox answer to the question of “Do androids dream of surplus value?” is “no”
because “they are values already.”154 Artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial life
forms—although these sciences are still in its infancy and it is questionable
whether AI will ever achieve the flexibility and generality of human
intelligence—do pose a challenge to Marx’s exclusively anthropological value
theory. The question must then be answered by considering under what conditions
(science fictional or otherwise) non-humans could potentially labour and create
value. Such a discussion would return to the central Marxist categories, such as
exploitation and class struggle, which have been bracketed in this paper.155
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Appendix 1: Göethe’s Wanderers Nachtlied/ Wanderer’s Nightsong
Über allen Gipfeln
Ist Ruh,
In allen Wipfeln
Spürest du
Kaum einen Hauch;
Die Vögelein schweigen im Walde.
Warte nur, balde
Ruhest du auch.

Above all summits
it is calm.
In all the tree-tops
you feel
scarcely a breath;
The birds in the forest are silent,
just wait, soon
you will rest as well!
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